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Screening for any disorder has an intuitive appeal, and ifdisorders can be identied before they have becomeapparent the rewards are even greater. Psychiatric
disorders, once established, are often dif cult to treat and can
have a major impact on the person and society. Hence,
numerous attempts have been made to screen not just for
established psychiatric disorders but for vulnerability to those
disorders. Few organisations have been more concerned with
these issues than the military. Recruits who fail in training or
leave the service early are a major drain on resources.
Servicemen who develop psychiatric disorders often function
poorly, while soldiers who develop psychological disorders
after combat are rendered ineffective for future service and
are likely to qualify for nancial assistance.
In this paper, we review the literature on screening for
vulnerability to psychological disorders in the armed forces
during the last century. The identication of those at risk of
later psychiatric breakdown when exposed to stress (in this
context largely combat) is the principal focus, though the
related issue of screening for military suitability is also
addressed. Nearly 90 years of attempts to identify those who
may break down in battle provide important lessons not just
for the services but for other organisations, such as the police
and re-ghters, whose staff are subjected to traumatic
situations.
METHODS
An extensive literature review was conducted by hand-
searching leading medical and psychological journals relat-
ing to World Wars I and II. Recent publications were
surveyed electronically using Medline, PsychLit, PubMed
and PILOTS, while the Journal of Traumatic Stress was hand-
searched. In addition, the major UK archives were investi-
gated for British applications.
Experimental phase
Screening for psychiatric vulnerability, that is the identica-
tion of those at risk of developing an adverse outcome but
who have yet to show manifest signs, began with the US
Army during World War I. Observers had witnessed the high
incidence of psychiatric battle casualties in the British and
French armies and were anxious to avoid such losses when
America entered the war in April 1917. Thomas Salmon
recommended screening to exclude “insane, feebleminded,
psychopathic and neuropathic individuals from the forces”
to “reduce very materially the difcult problem of caring for
mental and nervous cases in France, increase the military
efciency of the expeditionary forces and save the country
millions of dollars in pensions”.1
At rst, only those recruits who had come to the attention
of their company commanders or medical of cers because of
inappropriate behaviour or abnormal symptomatology were
referred for neuropsychiatric assessment. When soldiers
began to break down in France with diagnoses of shell
shock, the screen was considered too weak and specialists
were routinely attached to survey board centres.2 Never-
theless, assessments remained brief, relying largely on the
judgement of a few individuals. As a result, rejection rates
varied greatly between induction centres.
In part, psychological screening was linked to intelli-
gence testing and owed much to the work of Dr Robert
Yerkes, director of the US Army Psychological Testing
Corps. He headed a task force of psychologists who set out
to impose blanket testing of recruits not only to exclude
those of low intelligence but also to assess their abilities
and potential.3 Various instruments were designed to assist
of cer selection and rating, together with assignment to
particular trades. This represented the rst attempt to
predict the best soldiers rather than identify those most
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likely to suffer from a psychological disorder. A paper and
pencil survey, correlated with the standardised Stanford-
Binet intelligence test, was developed for the military. In
1917, Yerkes, with the help of Lewis Terman, David
Wechsler and others, developed multiple-choice Army
Alpha and non-verbal Beta tests to measure both literate
and illiterate subjects.4
In November 1917, Colonel Henry Shaw reported
favourably to the Surgeon General, recommending “that the
[screening] scheme be extended to include all enlisted and
drafted men and all newly appointed of cers, provided
competent psychologists can be found to take charge”.5 In
the same year, Robert Woodworth devised the personal data
sheet, the rst group personality test and forerunner of the
current Minnesota Multiple Personality Inventory, and this
was used briey to screen recruits. However, a cable sent
from General Pershing in July 1918 implied that the
effectiveness of these instruments was qualied: “Prevalence
of mental disorders in replacement troops recently received
suggests urgent importance of intensive efforts in eliminat-
ing mentally un t from organisation’s new draft prior to
departure from United States”.6
During World War I, 72,000 (2%) US recruits were
rejected on neuropsychiatric grounds either at boards or in
training.7 Draft boards screened out 15.1 men per 1000
registrants for psychopathy and allied mental disorders,8
while a further 0.5% were discharged at their  rst military
station. Latterly, Ginzberg et al. calculated that 68,000
(1.4%) recruits were rejected at enlistment, and a further
35,000 (0.9%) were discharged from the armed forces with
neuropsychiatric disorders.9
In February 1919, it was calculated that only 4039 (0.2%)
servicemen had been invalided from the American
Expeditionary Force in France with psychological disorders.
This was considered a success, given that 3181 soldiers had
been sent overseas against psychiatric advice.2 Yet no
attempt was made to discover how many of the deployed
men who had failed the screen were among the 4039
evacuated to the United States. Equally, no follow up was
conducted to discover what proportion of the 3181
performed efciently when in battle. Other studies also
created the impression that psychological testing had
worked. A follow-up study of 763 veterans with so-called
war neuroses showed that 36.9% were fully recovered by
1924–25, while a further 43.9% functioned at close to full
civilian efciency.10 However, these statistics did not take
account of the large number of pensions awarded for war
syndromes such as neurocirculatory asthenia and other
somatoform disorders. The variable and experimental nature
of these early attempts at selection led to the general con-
clusion that more effective screening measures were needed;
faith in the process itself had not been disturbed.11
Screening: Word War II
The high watermark of screening by the military for
vulnerability to psychological disorders came in World War
II. The outbreak of hostilities was greeted with warnings
about the past, references being made to the immense cost
imposed by the large numbers of psychiatrically damaged
servicemen after World War I.12,13 In the US, Hilman argued
that “a superior army cannot be moulded from inferior
individuals”,14 and Sutton believed that these “inferior” indi-
viduals could be readily identied.15 To combat the mistakes
of the past, great faith was placed in selection processes.16,17
Davidson, a military psychiatrist, wrote “if we thus set up
 lters against the defective, the unstable and potentially
neurotic . . . we’ll go far towards drying up our post-war
neurotics at source and so lighten the load of the Veteran’s
Bureau”.18 Statistical weight was added to these claims in
1941 when a survey of 200 servicemen with psychiatric
disorders admitted to Christie St. Hospital, Toronto, led
Baillie to conclude that 68 (34%) had “obvious symptoms
on enlistment”. A short neuropsychiatric examination, he
argued, would reduce the number of unsuitable soldiers “to
a very minor gure”.19
Medical Circular No. 1, issued in November 1940 by the US
Selective Service System, made psychiatric screening an
essential part of mass mobilisation, while Circular Letter No.
19, issued by the Surgeon General in March 1941, attempted
to impose common standards at induction stations.
Introduced in a spirit of optimism, Colonel Stanley, First
Corps Area Surgeon, argued that the induction neuro-
psychiatric examination should prevent at least 75% of
potential casualties.20 However, there were too few
psychiatrists to conduct even rudimentary examinations of
recruits during the emergency build-up of wartime forces.
Given the range of information that was to be gathered,21
assessors had to rely on self-completed Forms 149 and 200
supplied by the Selective Service. The rst included a brief
personal and family history, while the second related to
school and work record. Furthermore, in the early stages of
the war some psychiatric assessments were of a subjective
and idiosyncratic nature.22
To allow psychiatrists to concentrate their efforts on
borderline cases, John Appel, chief of preventative psychiatry
of the Surgeon General’s Ofce, led a search for a screening
questionnaire that would identify a subpopulation who
required more careful assessment. The Information and
Education Division, Army Service Forces, designed the
instrument (Neuropsychiatric Screening Adjunct or NSA),
though by the time of its adoption in October 1944, pressure
on military psychiatric services had passed and it was never
employed as intended.23
United Kingdom
In the UK, screening had a different rationale. Although the
authorities began the war with the common purpose of
avoiding the mistakes of World War I, and in particular the
epidemic of shell shock and other post-combat disorders,
their principal weapons were strict regulations about
diagnostic terms, restrictive pension criteria and strategies to
prevent premature discharge from the forces.24 The belief
that manpower resources were not being used effectively
provided the main impetus for screening. The increasingly
egalitarian stance adopted by some military psychiatrists and
psychologists was critical of traditional, class-based selection
methods. In April 1940, Lt Colonel Ronald Hargreaves used
Penrose-Raven Progressive Matrices, a pre-war test designed
to measure innate intelligence, to screen unsuitable
recruits.25 As a trial, matrices were given to servicemen
diagnosed with effort syndrome undergoing treatment in
the special treatment unit at Mill Hill Hospital. The results
purported to show that “neurotic men have less consistent
test scores [over time] than normal people” and that the
scores of the former improved with treatment.26 Army
psychiatrists concluded that about 4% of all intakes were
unsuitable for combatant units.
Considerable effort was put into instruments designed to
identify types of soldier and, in June 1941, a Directorate of
Selection Personnel was established for the British Army.27
In the following year, new recruits were enlisted into the
General Service Corps and posted to Primary Training
Centres where they completed a battery of intelligence and
aptitude tests. Each serviceman was interviewed by a
personnel selection of cer, who made recommendations
about the man’s deployment. Recruits with low test scores,
or who were regarded as unstable, were referred to military
psychiatrists who could recommend special employment or
discharge.28 Hence, the primary aim of this system was to
ensure that servicemen were placed in suitable trades or
occupations rather than the identication of potential
psychiatric casualties. With more modest aims, the British
army rejected far fewer recruits (1.4%) than the US Army
(7.2%) during World War II.27 The limited screens employed
by the British reected a widespread mistrust of psycho-
logical testing and the reduced levels of choice offered by a
much smaller population.
Outcomes of screening: United States
By spring 1943, it had become obvious from the large
numbers of psychiatric casualties that the screening pro-
gramme had failed in its preventive role. Admissions for
neuropsychiatric disorders had risen to 20,000 per month in
the US alone and reached a peak of 31,000 in August.
During the last month of the Buna-Gona campaign, the
neuropsychiatric admission rate was 60–70 per 1000 troops
for the entire Southwest Pacic area – four times that for the
American Expeditionary Force during World War I.29,30
Worse still, the programme was having an adverse effect on
the war effort. Selection programmes rejected too many
people, adding to the general manpower problems.31 Ofcial
directives documented the disillusionment, which culmi-
nated in the War Department Technical Bulletin (TB MED
33) issued on 21 April 1944. This stated that rejection for
neuropsychiatric reasons should only be made in “those
cases in which the history and examination clearly indicate
the existence in the past and/or present of a personality
disorder of partially or completely incapacitating degree”
and established that “individuals with minor personality
defects and neurotic trends could be of service”.
According to of cial statistics prepared by the US Ofce of
the Surgeon General, 7.2% of those registered for the draft
were turned down for neuropsychiatric reasons and a
further 4.3% because of low intelligence or educational
dif culties.32 This combined disqualication rate was six
times higher than that for World War I.33,34 Ginzberg et al. put
the rate slightly higher at 9.4%, representing 1,686,000
men.9 Discharges for neuropsychiatric disorders reached
504,000 (5%), signicantly higher than in World War I,
leading some to conclude that “the actual incidence of
neuropsychiatric conditions” was also greater.30 Hence,
despite a tough rejection policy, “large numbers of men with
emotional dif culties of all severities kept turning up”.35
Outcomes of screening: United Kingdom
In the UK, the Director of Manpower Planning at the War
Ofce argued for the retention of aptitude screening in the
post-war period so that it could be employed during National
Service. Yet the need to make economies and an enduring
suspicion of these methods brought an end to the General
Service Corps in 1948. Henceforth, recruits were admitted
directly to corps or regiments after a preliminary selection
test, the remainder of their assessment being completed
during training. The primacy of the regimental system was
restored and the part played by psychological testing in allo-
cating servicemen to different units downgraded. Never-
theless, the principle that these techniques could be used for
of cer and trade selection had been established and remains
so to this day.
Why did screening fail in World War II?
At the same time that doctors and of cials had been calling
for a screening programme, voices were also heard warning
against over-optimistic claims.36 Based on his experience
treating World War I veterans, Kardiner wrote “I should
hesitate to offer any criteria that can be used to predict that
a given candidate will have a traumatic neurosis”.37
The imprecise nature of screening instruments was raised
by Aita, who noted that it was “frequently dif cult . . . to
classify the exact reason for disqualication” in borderline
conditions.38 Later, he compared 154 servicemen whose
initial assessment had predicted a borderline outcome with
150 servicemen who had been identied as likely to be
successful. Although psychiatric casualties were three times
higher in the borderline group, for every two soldiers who
failed, three proved efcient and some were outstanding.39
Aita concluded that the screening techniques of 1941 had
little value because they relied on past behaviour. Predicting
how these men would perform in circumstances quite
different from anything they had experienced hitherto
involved guesswork.
In the immediate post-war period, a number of studies
were conducted to discover why the screening programmes
had failed. A broad-ranging survey of personality inventories
by Ellis and Conrad concluded that “except in samples
containing an unusually large proportion of psychiatrically
‘positive’ cases, the number of cases falsely classied as
positive by the inventory generally exceeds, by a great deal,
the number correctly classied as positive”.40
Egan and colleagues followed up 2054 men rejected by
the Selective Service System on psychiatric grounds, but
later inducted into the army – an elegant natural experi-
ment. Although their sample was not entirely random, the
study showed that only 18% had subsequently been
discharged from the forces on psychiatric grounds.41 Of the
rest, 82% had given “satisfactory duty” as compared with
94% of all enlisted personnel. They estimated that 1,992,950
men had been unnecessarily rejected for military service on
psychiatric grounds during World War II.
The variables used to reject those thought vulnerable to
later breakdown did, indeed, have low predictive power.
Brill and Beebe compared the rates of psychiatric admission
for World War II servicemen who had been assessed as being
at risk with those considered well-adjusted.42 In those with-
out such a history, 2% had been admitted to a psychiatric
facility compared with 29% of the marginal or predisposed
group. If allowance was made for those discharged with a
diagnosis of personality disorder but never formally
admitted for psychiatric care, the total rose to 35%.
Although this research conrmed that the likelihood of
admission was substantially higher in the identied popu-
lation, it also demonstrated the impracticalities of screening
for such predispositions. At least 65% of an at-risk
population rendered satisfactory service. Had the examiners
rejected everyone from this marginal group at induction, the
army would have been deprived of one million men who
never broke down.
As regards the related question of how those diagnosed
with psychiatric disorders actually performed in combat,
Plesset followed up 138 soldiers who in training had shown
“sufcient adjustment dif culty to necessitate psychiatric
attention”.43 After 30 days of combat, 137 remained on
active duty, and one had received a gallantry medal. By the
42 Jones, Hyams, Wessely
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end of the war, 120 remained on duty and eight had been
awarded Bronze Stars. A further study investigated the
performance of 395 men diagnosed during training with
mild psychological disorders. Subjected to combat during the
Ardennes campaign, only nine became psychiatric casualties
during the rst 50 days of battle. A survey of admissions to
the casualty clearing station showed no abnormal increase in
evacuations for other reasons.44
A random sample of 316 infantry and armoured troops,
who had been treated in forward psychiatric treatment
centres, were followed up to assess their effectiveness when
returned to combat units. Only 84 (26.6%) were rated by
their commanders as performing with a rating of “good” or
“fair” within three months of their redeployment. Those
who had achieved “good” or “fair” ratings were largely
drawn from two diagnostic groups: 68.8% of those with a
pre-existing conversion disorder and 67.7% of those with
no pre-service psychological illness, while 51.2% of service-
men with “neurosis existing prior to induction” also
performed reasonably.45 These results showed that
psychiatric casualties were not directly correlated with pre-
existing disorders and that to eliminate all those with a
history of mental illness would deprive the armed forces of
valuable manpower.
The measures themselves showed unacceptable variation or
poor inter-rater reliability. For example, when psychiatrists
were preferred to pencil and paper tests, the accuracy of
prediction was no better. Variations between induction
centres were so vast as once again to bring the system into
disrepute – a difference of 35 times in rejection rates.9,11
The premise that selection would prevent psychiatric
casualties failed for one further reason. The main cause of
combat fatigue was not a soldier’s pre-service personality but
the intensity of battle itself.46–48 A study by Brill and Beebe
found that the majority of US servicemen admitted with
psychiatric diagnoses in 1942–43 had pre-existing emotional
disorders. By 1944–45, most admissions for psychoneurosis
were as a result of exposure to combat, and 50% were
soldiers who had been assessed as clinically normal at entry.35
Korean War
The US army, to its credit, put into practice some of the
lessons learned in the aftermath of World War I, namely that
screening was more effective if variables could be measured
accurately.33 A retrospective study of a rapid screening
procedure applied in 1943–44 to assess intellectual and
emotional deciencies in the US Marine Corps had
reportedly identied 78% of those subsequently discharged,
though it also generated 11% false-positives.49 Nevertheless,
it was also shown that the judgements of drill instructors in
weeding out unsuitable men proved no less efcient than
the screen instruments, suggesting that these were observ-
able disorders rather than potential vulnerabilities. In the
light of similar studies, the emphasis placed on intelligence
was increased, while less attention was paid to the detection
of psychological vulnerability, and a more liberal policy was
adopted towards so-called borderline cases.
As a result of more modest aims, the rate of neuro-
psychiatric rejections fell from the 7.2% recorded during
World War II to 2.1% during the Korean con ict. However,
those excluded on grounds of mental deciency rose from
4.3% to 13.4%, largely because of the emphasis given to
intelligence testing. In the aftermath of the war, Voth argued
that “exception is taken to the premise that brief psychiatric
screening is of value in predicting possible psychiatric
casualties, except in certain obvious cases”.50
Glass and colleagues retrospectively examined a random
sample of 505 inductees, who had entered training in
August 1951 and hence already passed through the
psychiatric screening process.32 An analysis of service records
and evaluations by unit commanders showed that prediction
of military effectiveness was unreliable. For combat and
combat-support troops deployed to Korea, forecasts of
below-average or poor performance had been unduly
pessimistic. Troops sent overseas to non-combat theatres
also performed far better than predicted. Greater accuracy
was obtained with servicemen assigned non-combat roles in
the United States, screening having identied 88.8% of
those who were unable to function. Yet most of these
servicemen had broken down during or shortly after train-
ing, and were soldiers who had experienced difculties
adjusting from civilian to military life. The authors
concluded that overt signs of psychiatric abnormality could
only forecast military effectiveness over a relatively brief
period.
Post-1953
The search for an accurate screening instrument did not
cease after the Korean War.51 The Fort Ord Inventory (FOI)
was designed to identify affective disturbances that would
impair military service. Tests on 15,000 recruits conrmed
the design of four scales, which differentiated between those
with leadership potential and those with poor adjustment
qualities: delinquency, neurosis, fake bad (malingering) and
femininity.52 Although the authors concluded that they
could detect “the major types of emotional abnormalities”,
the FOI was not designed to predict how soldiers might
perform in combat. A follow-up study of 134 naval recruits
enlisted between 1960 and 1961, who had been rejected on
psychological grounds but had been purposely allowed to
graduate from training, found that two years later 97
(72.4%) were still on active duty.53 It was hypothesised that
most had experienced “emotional growth” during their
service and that the disturbances picked up on screening
were “merely transitory”. The authors appeared to pay little
attention to the most obvious explanation – that the instru-
ments performed badly – though they did conclude that
“psychiatric screening has . . . limited value”.
Huffman suggested that a factor in the low incidence of
psychiatric cases during the Vietnam War was the effective-
ness of screening.54 However, the US Army had not employed
an organised screening programme for inductees to assess
psychological vulnerability during the conict. Glass and his
colleagues had raised sufcient doubt about the accuracy of
psychiatric predictions of both military effectiveness and the
likelihood of developing psychological disorders.32 Further-
more, the military encountered recruitment dif culties
throughout what became an unpopular war, so that there
was little scope to reject both volunteers and conscripts.
Nevertheless, the military had some success with the more
limited goal of attempting to identify recruits who would
complete basic training. Elements of an 82-item question-
naire dealing with personal adjustments and attitudes,
which was given to 9194 airforce trainees, were said to
predict outcome with “uncanny accuracy”.55 Subsequently,
the Health Opinion Survey (HOS) applied to 1462 recruits at
their induction and to the 1167 who completed their train-
ing gave only broad statistical risk predictions.56 The raw
data showed that the scale had unacceptably low specicity
and sensitivity for routine use.
Another study, which used a complex battery of physical
and psychological measures to predict who would complete
basic training, gave borderline results for female recruits but
proved unreliable for males.57 Some successes were
recorded, though the variables that could be measured most
accurately were straightforward, largely concerned with age,
education or reason for enlistment,58,59 reiterating one of the
basic requirements for screening that variables be measured
accurately. The US Air Force persisted with personality
assessments to assess those in training, but only achieved a
predictive power of 50%.60 Not deterred, a research pro-
gramme at Wilford Hall Medical Center, Texas, designed the
Air Force Medical Evaluation Test Programme (AFMET) to
identify trainees with signicant psychological problems.61
Although AFMET has plausibly saved valuable resources
through early discharges, the system did encounter
problems, including “excessive misidentications”.62 A
further attempt to assess outcomes in US Air Force trainees
suggested promising results, though the authors conceded
that further research was needed to improve accuracy.63 By
1990, disillusionment with personality testing was wide-
spread, not just in the military.64
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
The of cial recognition of PTSD in 1980 opened a new
chapter in the history of psychological screening as investi-
gators attempted to identify risk factors for this high-pro le
diagnosis. A meta-analysis by Brewin et al. of 45 retro-
spective and prospective studies used statistical techniques
to increase the predictive power of each investigation and
overcome some of the problems associated with small
sample sizes.65 Overall, the results showed that no single
variable was a particularly powerful predictor of developing
PTSD. The best indicator, though by no means exceptionally
strong, was the intensity of the trauma itself. This was not a
new nding, having been identied in World War II studies
of combat fatigue. By denition, such a factor cannot be
used in recruitment or pre-deployment screening.
Associations with PTSD were noted for other variables,
which could be measured before combat, and included
gender, age, social class, intelligence, education, family,
personal histories of psychiatric disorder and, more contro-
versially, childhood abuse. Yet all contributed very little to
the overall risk. The associations were statistically signicant
(because meta-analytic techniques had increased the sample
size) but actually were very small. Little heterogeneity was
found amongst the risk factors identied, and only previous
psychiatric history emerged as a uniform variable. As a
result, Brewin concluded that “attempts to identify a
common set of pre-trauma predictors of PTSD that will be
equally valid across different traumatized groups are
premature”.65
Current policy: Bosnia and Kosovo
In February 1996 all US military personnel deployed to
Bosnia for more than 30 days were required to complete a
mental health screen as they returned to their home station.
Respondents who exceeded pre-established, cut-off criteria
completed a secondary survey and were then interviewed by
a mental health care provider to determine referral needs.66
However, as part of the Kosovo operations in April 2000 an
element of pre-deployment screening was introduced,
though it had the primary purpose of detecting existing
morbidity (acute stress disorder symptoms and reactions to
traumatic exposures) rather than predicting or preventing
future problems.67 Results from the psychological surveil-
lance programmes in Bosnia and Kosovo have shown that it
is possible to monitor changes in the mental health status of
personnel during deployments and that a large-scale screen
can effectively identify soldiers requiring referral. However,
the instrument provides a snapshot of the soldier’s current
psychological state without being able to predict longer-term
outcomes.
We also draw attention to the Recruit Assessment
Program (RAP) now instituted to collect baseline data from
all US military personnel on entry to the armed forces.68
Whilst, at present, this is not intended to be a return to the
old days of screening for psychological vulnerability, it will
offer an invaluable resource on which to test predictions and
models of subsequent military performance and mental
health. As such, the RAP will provide extensive health data
from large numbers of men and women to assist in the
identication of risk factors for psychiatric illnesses.
DISCUSSION
Although screening for psychological vulnerability to break-
down under stress remains a most desirable goal, this review
suggests that its achievement has been elusive. By contrast,
screening has been shown to be effective for certain well-
measured variables, such as low intelligence and psychosis,
which are powerful predictors of failure in military service.
Instruments to assess aptitude have been progressively
rened and are used by all the main military powers to assist
of cer selection and trade deployment. Screening has also
been shown to identify accurately those who are unlikely to
complete their basic training, saving valuable resources.
However, screening becomes more problematic when
applied to prediction of breakdown under stress. Some key
variables, such as leadership, morale, intensity and result of
battle, preparedness, which contribute to functioning,
cannot be known at induction. The imprecision of current
measurement also presents an obstacle to identication. Our
knowledge of what makes people subject to PTSD remains
relatively crude, including past psychiatric history, social
class, family history and childhood abuse. None of these
have sufcient explanatory power to justify a screening
programme.65
While no variable or combination of variables has yet
been found that will accurately identify vulnerability, some
historical data suggest that signicant predictors may exist.
In their retrospective study, Brill and Beebe discovered that
“the vast majority of army admissions in 1942 and 1943
involved men with clear-cut, pre-existing emotional
disorders”, while in 1944 and 1945, when combat was the
dominant factor, 50% were found to have a history of
psychological problems.35 Although Aita concluded that the
screening techniques of 1941 were too imprecise to justify
their continued use, these instruments had succeeded in
identifying psychiatric casualty rates that were three times
higher than in the controls. The problem was that 60% of
those identied as borderline proved to be efcient soldiers,
undermining any gains that would have accrued in rejecting
potential breakdowns. Hence, even if our current knowl-
edge is inadequate, it is possible that further research into
psychosocial and possibly genetic factors that convey vulner-
ability may contribute to the design of an effective screening
instrument.
There still remains the problem of how to avoid rejecting
those recruits with a history of psychological illness who in
practice would have proved to be good soldiers. The
disastrous screening programme of the early years of World
War II remains a salutary example of the damage that
inaccurate instruments can in ict.
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Insufcient consideration has been given to the side-
effects of screening. It remains uncertain what would
happen if someone were identied as vulnerable, though
the consequences of such a decision are of considerable
importance. First, the individual would be given a
psychiatric label, which is likely to adversely affect their
career whether in the military or as a civilian. If retained in
the armed forces, then some action should be taken to
address that vulnerability. However, there is no inter-
vention currently available that has been shown to reduce
that risk. Alternatively, persons identied as vulnerable
might have to be found a low-stress occupation. But do
such assignments exist now that the distinction between
forward and rear positions has become blurred? No
consideration has been given to the effect of screening on
an individual’s view of himself or herself. From thinking
that they are healthy, recruits might now believe them-
selves to be psychologically un t, with adverse effects for
their self-esteem and behaviour.69 If Brewin is correct that
social disadvantage, gender and ethnicity are risk factors for
PTSD,65 then should recruitment from such groups be
scaled down?
The belief continues that the armed forces serve a social
purpose, other than preparing for war, and that the structure
and training provided by military service are of use in their
own right. Many have commented that simply excluding
those who are at higher risk for adverse outcomes not only
reduces the manpower pool, but also misses an opportunity
to bring benet to the lives of people who might otherwise
have worse social and psychological futures. If, for example,
the military decided to refuse men and women from
disadvantaged backgrounds on the grounds that these have
been shown to be risk factors for later psychiatric disorder,
then not only would traditional sources of recruitment be
compromised, but a chance to improve mental health would
be lost.
Just as screening for vulnerability needs to be distin-
guished from screening for aptitude, so it is important to
discriminate between screening for actual, as opposed to
future, disorders. That signicant advances have been
achieved in the latter can be seen from the instruments
used to test US forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, though
dif culties encountered included imprecision, false-
positives, false-negatives and reluctance in the target
population because of stigma. Nevertheless, results from
these large-scale programmes have demonstrated that it is
possible to identify effectively the soldiers who require
psychiatric referral.67 These early ndings suggest that
psychological surveillance, if not actual screening, may
yield valuable results when applied to military populations
exposed to stress.
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